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Abstract 
The question of ‘What is the “Coase Theorem”?’ has no simple answer. The majority of 
articles covering a variety of issues on the ‘Coase Theorem’ still misrepresent the main 
message of Coase (1960). The remaining controversy over the ‘Coase Theorem’ is because 
the literature on Coase (1960) has been locked into a pathway which was set out by Stigler’s 
1996 book, The Theory of Price. Even almost 50 years after the publication of Coase’s 
original article, the consequence of the initial condition under which Coase’s contribution was 
first formulated (Stigler 1966) is not perfectly eliminated. The evolution of the ‘Coase 
Theorem’ has now become an example to intellectual path dependence in economics. 
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The ‘Coase Theorem’ vs. Coase Theorem Proper:  
How an error emerged and why it remained uncorrected so long 
George Stigler invited Ronald Coase to Chicago in 1959 to give a speech at a workshop that he organized. 
Coase accepted the invitation. After the workshop Coase asked the learned audience of Chicago to hold a 
special meeting to discuss his approach to the ‘rationale of property rights’ which the Chicagoans thought was 
an error and Coase should delete from his 1959 article, ‘The Federal Communications Commission.’ The 
meeting was arranged. Big shots of Chicago gathered at the residence of Aaron Director, the founder of the 
Journal of Economics and Law. Milton Friedman, Arnold Harberger, and John McGee were at the meeting. 
‘How could such a fine economist like Coase think,’ his fellows at Chicago wondered, ‘that there were costs 
involved in the operation of price mechanism in the market?’ The discussion took about two hours. It was 
during this meeting that Coase convinced his Chicago colleagues of his argument. And so was it possible for 
the next generation of economists to know ‘probably the most widely cited article in the whole of the modern 
economic literature.’ ‘I persuaded these economists that I was right,’ reported Coase in his autobiographical 
Nobel Prize speech in 1991, ‘and I was asked to write up my argument for publication in the Journal of Law 
and Economics …. Had it not been for the fact that these economists at the University of Chicago thought that 
I had made an error in my article on ‘The Federal Communications Commission,’ it is probable that ‘The 
Problem of Social Cost [1960]’ would never have been written’ (Coase 1992) [1]. 
Coase’s 1960 article deserves special attention in the history of economic thought. Firstly, the 
innovative idea that the article developed has spread fast and broad in economics (see Appendix A, B, and C). 
Secondly, the life history of the idea has featured distinguishing properties making the article unique in 
intellectual history [2]. In this essay, I focus on another specificity of the article: that the actual message of 
Coase has been misrepresented and Coase’s main message in the article contradicted the ‘Coase 
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Theorem.’ A number of papers have already elaborated on this point. (See, for instance, Medema 1994, 1999, 
2002, McCloskey 1998, Usher 1998, and Fox 2007.) My aim here is (i) have a clear idea about the 
significance of the contradiction between the meaning of the ‘Coase Theorem’ and the original message of 
Coase in his 1960 article by way of examining some of the most cited and recent literature mentioning the 
‘Coase Theorem’ and (ii) account for why the ‘market for ideas’ (Coase 1974b) has failed to correct the 
misrepresentation which has long been reported, clearly and repeatedly, by Coase himself (Coase 1981) as 
well as many others in a number of publications. 
In order to accomplish the first task I have conducted a survey in which I studied 40 articles 
mentioning the ‘Coase Theorem’ so as to see whether (and in what ways) economists have subscribed to the 
‘Coase Theorem’ in their works. The survey resulted that of the most cited and recent articles referring to the 
‘Coase Theorem’ 75 percent misrepresented Coase 1960. (For details about the survey, see below) [3]. Why 
did this failure happen and why did the misrepresentation remain uncorrected for so long? In order to explain 
this, I use a simplified model of path dependence and argue that the evolution of the ‘Coase Theorem’ features 
a property of intellectual path dependence in economics: the second-generation models built upon the ‘Coase 
Theorem’ have failed to replicate the results of the previous generation (i.e. Stigler 1966 and others) and the 
controversy in the original message of Coase (1960) has remained unresolved. The evolutionary mechanism 
that gives rise to such results is ‘replication failure.’ ‘An economic view of replication failure in science 
suggest that errors and mistakes are a constant aspect of the scientific endeavor … [T]he continuous presence 
of faulty research is a by-product of scarce resources being focused on a quest for innovative discoveries’ 
(Wible 1998: 43). The main reason for such contradictions in the history of ideas not to disappear easily (or 
not at all) is that the history of ideas does not always function so as to fix errors fully. In other words, the 
‘market for ideas’ does not operate like a perfect market and the effects of several small events, such as errors 
and misrepresentations in analyses, often remain uncorrected for long periods due to high ‘epistemic costs’ of 
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replicating old findings. This suggests that the scholarly life of economists is a positive transaction costs 
world in which negative externalities (e.g. misrepresentations of ideas) are not always and perfectly self-
corrective. Positive feedback loops in the world in which intellectuals live and operate (such as journals, 
conferences, and other informal meetings) do not allow perfecting solutions to come about so easily. The 
invisible hand in the market for ideas, so to speak, often operates undesirably and errors frequently remain 
uncorrected. 
The essay consists of three parts. In the first part, I provide an overview of Coase’s 1960 article and 
show what the main message of Coase (1960) was and how Stigler interpreted it in his 1966 book. In the 
second part, I summarize the findings of a survey in which I examine the ways in which the most cited and 
recent articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ use Coase (1960) or rely on the methodology of Coase (1960) in their 
works. The third part is on how replication failure works and how it can be used as an explanation of the 
unresolved controversy in the evolutionary history of the ‘Coase Theorem.’ Finally, conclusions follow.   
Coase Theorem Proper and the ‘Coase Theorem’ As Economists Know It 
The main point in Coase’s 1960 article, ‘The Problem of Social Cost,’ was to provide a criticism of the 
established theory of negative externalities. According to Coase, accounts of negative externalities were 
inadequate; the price mechanism was not easily able to solve the problems that arose out of the harmful 
effects of individual actions on others. Economists, since Arthur Cecil Pigou, have believed that taxes and 
other kinds of governmental regulations were the best ways of diminishing the negative effects of individual 
behavior. In view of that, the government should restrain those responsible for the ‘harmful effects’ of 
individual action in the market. Although this was not unwise, Coase argued, such a solution would depend on 
whether the ‘gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a 
result of stopping the action which produces the harm’ (Coase 1960). There is no single solution to every 
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problem in the market. Economists should be more concerned with the consequences that happen in actual 
cases – not merely with the consequences that happen on the blackboard only. 
For Coase, the problem was to understand the causation between the parties in which one party is 
supposed to inflict harm upon the other. The problem featured a reciprocal nature: ‘To avoid the harm to B 
would inflict harm on A,’ wrote Coase, ‘The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to 
harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm.’ Carrying out 
market transactions (such as conducting negotiations with parties, drawing up a contract, reaching an 
agreement about the terms of the contract, and so on) were costly – ‘sufficiently costly at any rate,’ wrote 
Coase, ‘to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked 
without cost’ (Coase 1960). In other words, the positive transactions cost world in which we live does not 
always allow parties to conduct negotiations that end up with an efficient (re-)allocation of resources and 
rights. Under positive transaction costs, ‘the initial delimitation of rights does have an effect on the efficiency 
with which the economic system operates’ (Coase 1960). Then, assigning private property rights (no matter to 
whom) might be a solution to the problem of social cost as negative externalities are not self-corrective. In 
other words, in the world we live we need a legal system that prevents one party from inflicting harm on 
another, instead of a ruling state that punishes, by way of introducing taxes, the party responsible for the 
harm. The problem is, therefore, to decide on the appropriate social arrangement for possible harmful effects. 
This requires a case-by-case investigation of different ways of handling the problem. [4] 
Coase introduced his view in 1960. But the ‘Coase Theorem’ as economists know it has become 
established in economic theory only after Stigler’s third addition of his Theory of Price (1966). (The first 
edition of the book appeared in 1952. It did not mention any of Coase’s works.) According to Stigler, Coase’s 
1960 article raised important issues about the efficiency of markets, government intervention, and property 
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rights. In a famous passage, Stigler said thus: ‘[t]he Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition 
private and social costs will be equal. It is a more remarkable proposition to us older economists who have 
believed the opposite for a generation, than it will appear to the young reader who was never wrong, here’ 
(Stigler 1966: 113). Having introduced the ‘new’ conception into economic theory, Stigler, in his later career, 
did not seriously return to any other original publication of Coase but cited Coase (1960) in his more recent 
works only twice, in 1983 and in 1989 (see Stigler 1983 and 1989). The ‘theorem’ has since become an 
important topic of investigation. 
Today, the controversy over ‘Coase Theorem’ lingers and a common misrepresentation regarding 
Coase’s contribution dominates the economic literature. Today, picking up any text book from any library, 
one will see that the ‘Coase Theorem’ is elaborated as if Coase himself argued there were no transaction costs 
in the market. Coase, in fact, did not argue this. He instead argued that there are transaction costs in the 
market. The ‘theorem’ was not a proper formulation of Coase’s message.  
Coase did not argue that the pricing system worked without costs. The reason why he used the 
example of zero transaction costs was (i) heuristic (Zerbe 1980) and (ii) he showed that even under the 
assumption of zero transaction costs, the Pigouvian system was ‘inadequate’ and ‘incorrect’ (Medema 1995). 
Therefore, we cannot reduce Coase (1960) to the ‘Coase Theorem.’ In fact, Coase complained in his Nobel 
Prize Lecture in 1991 that his original message has long been misunderstood. Almost 50 years after Coase 
first published his ‘The Problem of Social Cost,’ the consequence of the initial condition under which Coase’s 
contribution was first formulated (Stigler 1966) is not eliminated. The ‘market for ideas’ has failed to correct 
the error fully even today. ‘I would not wish to conclude,’ reported Coase (1981),  
that, while consideration of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us 
valuable insights, these insights are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the 
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analysis of the real world of positive transaction costs. We do not do well to devote ourselves to a 
detailed study of the world of zero transaction costs, like augurs divining the future by the minute 
inspection of the entrails of a goose. 
In effect, Stigler’s interpretation of Coase (1960) has made Coase’s contribution disappear. The ‘Coase 
Theorem’ in actuality had been stated long before Coase, and therefore does not belong to the works of Coase, 
but of Adam Smith. In other words, the ‘Coase Theorem’ existed even before Coase (Friedman, Mimeo). The 
‘core’ of the ‘Coase Theorem’ was empty (Aivazian and Callen 1981). One would never need the ‘Coase 
Theorem,’ as Coase himself reports also, to say that ‘people will use resources in the way that produces the 
most value’ (Hazlett 1997). This amounts to saying that we are living in a world without transaction costs. 
However, Coase believed in the contrary: we live in a world of positive transaction costs. The naming of the 
‘Coase Theorem’ is, therefore, erroneous because the theorem meant the opposite of what Coase wrote in his 
works. There may be a few exceptional occasions outside the blackboard world in which transaction costs are 
so low (still positive though) as to be taken into consideration. Coase did not exclude this possibility. 
Nevertheless, the origin of the theorem is controversial since the message of the ‘Coase Theorem’ is not what 
Coase meant in 1960. Implications of the ‘Coase Theorem’ are not always useful because the assumption of a 
zero transaction costs world is too restrictive and presupposes a world that does not comply with the facts of 
the world. 
Survey and evidence 
Below is a summary of the survey in which I examined 40 articles mentioning the ‘Coase Theorem.’ While 
picking the articles I relied on the search engine of ISI Web of Knowledge (as of March 2010.) The keyword I 
used to search the database was ‘Coase theorem.’ Alternative options to pick up the articles to examine were 
“Coase,” “Ronald Coase,” and “transaction costs.” I, however, preferred not to use these keywords because 
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the contributions of Ronald Coase to the economic science are beyond the ‘Coase Theorem’ and searching for 
any of the three would yield less qualified results in the sense that the ISI would not filter the articles on, say, 
firm theory.  
Authors of the articles reported in the survey contributed to the economic literature using the central 
theme in the ‘Coase Theorem.’ In so doing, they referred to the works of Coase as well as Stigler. The figure 
below is intended to provide a brief summary of the survey. The figure is organized in four sub-categories in 
all of which there are four columns showing (i) whether the article has referred to any of the works of Coase 
and Stigler and (ii) in what sense the article used the findings of Coase (1960). 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The findings are parallel to the results of another survey conducted by Buttler and Garnett (2003) in which 
they examined textbook representations of the ‘Coase Theorem’ only: ‘A few get it right.’ The survey 
conducted here relies on the most frequently cited and the most recent articles on or about the ‘Coase 
Theorem’ since 1968 and suggests the following:  
1. Of the articles listed below almost 75 percent subscribe to the ‘Coase Theorem.’ Stigler’s 
interpretation of Coase (1960) has dominated the history of economic ideas for five decades. 
2. None of the articles in Category A, B, and C (30 articles in total) subscribe to the Coase Theorem 
Proper. Publications right after Stigler’s Theory of Price (1966) as well as the most frequently cited articles on 
transaction costs and other related fields fully adopted Stigler’s interpretation. Two articles (Kelman 1979 and 
Lemley 1995) reported the controversy about the ‘Coase Theorem’ but nevertheless did not adapt the correct 
interpretation in their works. 
3. Not much has changed after Coase’s Nobel Prize speech: none of the ten most cited articles after 
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1991 subscribe to the Coase Theorem Proper. 
4. The most cited article on the ‘Coase Theorem’ (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990) did not cite 
any works of Coase. Additionally, almost half of the articles citing one (or more) of Coase’s works also cited 
one (or more) of Stigler’s works. Stigler has a visible impact on the literature. 
5. In more recent years, the ‘market for ideas’ seems to have started to correct the error and replicate 
Coase’s original findings (1960). In the past three years, half of the articles on transaction costs and other 
related fields subscribed to the Coase Theorem Proper. The powerful effect of Stigler’s 1966 book still exists 
after 50 years and the ‘Coase Theorem’ is still widespread among economists even after several publications 
reporting Stigler’s interpretation – even the web site of the University of Chicago Law School has not 
corrected the misrepresentation: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/socrates/coase.html. 
Below are excerpts from a number of articles that are examined in the survey. 
CATEGORY (A): Most cited 10 articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ 
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler (1998): ‘When combined with the notion that opportunity and out-of-pocket 
costs are equated (see fundamental principle two), this yields the Coase theorem – the idea that initial 
assignments of entitlements will not affect the ultimate allocation of resources so long as transaction costs are 
zero.’ 
Korobkin (1998a): ‘The Coase theorem is generally understood to predict that contracting parties will 
bargain to the efficient allocation of rights and responsibilities, irrespective of initial entitlements if and only 
if transaction costs are low. Consequently, in a Coasean world, parties will agree on efficient contract terms if 
transaction costs are low, irrespective of the substance of default rules. The corollary to this application of the 
Coase theorem is that when transaction costs are high, contracting parties will not contract around inefficient 
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defaults.’ 
Krier and Schwab (1995): ‘Absent any impediments to bargaining, an initial mistaken (inefficient) 
assignment of an entitlement can (will) always be corrected by subsequent transactions between the parties.’ 
Elhauge (1991): ‘The Coase Theorem provides that, no matter how the legal rule assigns initial rights 
or liabilities, the efficient outcome will always result if private bargaining in unimpeded by transaction costs 
or other obstacles.’ 
Kaplow and Shavell (1996): ‘As Coase emphasized, if there are no obstacles to the consummation of 
mutually beneficial bargains, it will make no difference what the legal regime is: thus, it will be irrelevant 
whether property rules or liability rules apply.’ 
CATEGORY (B): Most recent 10 articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ 
Halpin (2007) and Lai and Hung (2008) report the controversy about the ‘Coase Theorem’ but stick to 
the erroneous misrepresentation of the theorem in their works. 
Charness et al. (2007): ‘… with well-defined property rights, no transaction costs, and fully symmetric 
information, efficiency is neutral to the assignment of responsibilities for damages; this result has come to be 
called the Coase theorem.’ 
Halpin (2007): ‘A well known statement of the Coase Theorem within the legal literature is that 
provided by Jules Coleman (1988: 69) in the following terms: Given traditional assumptions of substantial 
knowledge, perfect rationality and the absence of both transaction costs and income effects, the assignment of 
legal entitlements in cases of two-party incompatible land uses will be neutral as to the goal of allocative 
efficiency. In simple terms, the counterintuitive thrust of the theorem is that it does not matter whether the law 
imposes liability on an activity or not: the market value of the activity to A as against the market value of its 
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absence to B will determine whether the activity goes ahead or not purely as a matter of efficiency.’ 
Lee and Sabourina (2007): ‘This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, explores the extent 
of the validity of the Coase theorem. In particular, we highlight the role of “transaction costs” in explaining 
why individuals may not fully exploit mutual gains from trade via bargaining and negotiation. The central 
message of the paper is that, when each player has a preference for less complex strategies (at the margin), 
only efficient equilibria arise in complete information models of bargaining/negotiation without transaction 
costs while, in sharp contrast, perpetual disagreement, and inefficiency, are the only possible features of an 
equilibrium outcome with arbitrarily small transaction costs. Thus, in what follows the Coase theorem is valid 
if and only if there are no transaction costs.’ 
Rosenkranz and Schmit (2007): ‘According to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always 
exploit all possible gains from trade, provided there are no frictions (specifically, if there is symmetric 
information). They will hence write a contract that induces party A to choose the efficient activity level and 
divide the gains from trade by appropriate transfer payments. Thus, if one does not make the assumption that 
the government has better information than the parties themselves (which many economists consider to be 
unrealistic), Coasean bargaining makes Pigouvian taxation unnecessary.’ 
CATEGORY (C): First 10 articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ 
Nutter (1968): ‘[Coase] showed that, whenever the costs of market transactions can be neglected, the 
‘damaging agent’ will make the same calculation of marginal cost whether charged with responsibility for 
damages or not.’ 
Mumey (1971): ‘Coase contends that with no transaction costs, victims of social costs will, in the 
absence of liability placement by law, offers bribes for abstention to inflictors of the costs.’ 
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CATEGORY (D): Most cited 10 articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ after 1991 
Korobkin (1998b): ‘In The Problem of Social Cost, the foundational article of the law and economics 
movement, Ronald Coase suggested that when transaction costs are zero, the initial allocation of a legal 
entitlement is irrelevant to its eventual ownership. Assuming no transaction costs, the Coase Theorem predicts 
that if part A values an entitlement more than does party B, A will keep the entitlement if it is initially 
allocated to him, and he will buy it if it is originally allocated to B. This powerful insight depends on the 
behavioral assumption that an individual’s valuation of entitlements does not depend on ownership; that is, A 
values an entitlement neither more nor less if he is initially allocated that entitlement than if it is initially given 
to B.’ 
An Explanation: Replication Failure 
The mechanism that has given rise to a discrepancy in the economic literature about the contribution of 
Ronald Coase is ‘replication failure’: economists thinking that Coase’s contribution was important could and 
should have re-checked the theorem from the 1960 article instead of simply reproducing the conclusions of 
Stigler’s 1966 book but they never did so until recently. Today, the ‘Coase Theorem’ has turned into a 
phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in which a small event – a (mis-)interpretation of an original 
contribution – grew so big – the ‘Coase Theorem’ – that it has dominated the entire economic literature. 
Replication failure is the inability or unwillingness of researchers to test the result of previously 
published scholarly work. It is through replication that theories and research programs are checked in terms of 
their defensibility, consistency, and coherency. Although replication should be an essential component of 
scholarly work, such an endeavor is not handled by researchers frequently because ‘an economist might 
allocate a larger proportion of time to producing new publishable results devoting relatively less time and 
effort to the tasks required for replication’ (Wible 1998: 25). Replication of results is time consuming and 
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there is no reward for scholars to repeat another’s work. No significant research devotes time and effort to 
replicating the findings of earlier theories and research programs without compensating their economic loss. 
Instead, researchers rely on the results of papers published in academic journals and they simply ‘reproduce’ 
their findings without examining its significance and validity (Mirowski and Sklivas 1991: 154). 
James Wible reports that the reason why replication rarely takes place in scholarly life is that ‘science 
is more complex than mechanical reenactments of simple experiments.’ Many factors play important roles: for 
instance, processes of inference and judgment are not totally individual but rather a social phenomenon. It is 
difficult to replicate certain experiments without the specialized knowledge of earlier researchers. Sometimes, 
derived results of earlier works could be unreplicable: data may be lost, technical possibilities may not allow 
researchers to set up identical experimental environments, there may be informational asymmetries, and so 
forth and so on. Moreover, attempts by rival scientists and graduate students to criticize and publish new 
findings on older data as part of their routine scientific doings are construed as hostile acts (Wible 1998: 30). 
However, scholarly work is ‘chain-connected.’ Subsequent research depends on previous studies. 
Findings of prior studies are used as input for upcoming research. For researchers, replication failure is an 
economic phenomenon. That is to say, there is an economical item that is often neglected by epistemologists, 
time. To put it in a straightforward way: economic behavior in markets is sensitive to the opportunity costs of 
time. When researchers start off a new research project, they allocate time between replicable and 
unreplicable research. ‘The economizing of resources thus exposes science to mistakes,’ writes Wible (1998: 
31), 
At some point, these mistakes will be discovered and they will have to be corrected. From an 
economic point of view, there needs to be a balance between resources devoted to replication in its 
simpler forms and innovation. Attitudes and reward structures which are skewed toward innovation 
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may set science up for replication failures of many types. But mistakes need to be corrected or they 
will impede scientific progress and innovation at some point. 
Authors, referees, and editors of journals often assume earlier findings are valid without retesting them in 
significant ways because replication takes time and this imposes significant costs on researchers. Bypassing 
replication generates the probability of genetic (i.e. reproductive) errors that had occurred in an earlier study 
but not noticed in time. In scholarly life, it is expected that such errors will be corrected as scientists do 
further research on the subject matter. But because of the costs of running such tests, some errors may pass 
unnoticed and be left uncorrected. This is a source of intellectual path dependence in which scientific markets 
operate in the absence of an ‘invisible hand’ that could have prevented errors from happening or corrected 
them in the long run. Seeds of intellectual lock-in are stored in the scholarly market within the epistemic costs 
organically attached to pursuing scientific research.  
 Originality of the issue, as is formulated by Wible, is that not all research fails to replicate earlier 
findings. A considerable amount of time is in fact devoted to the replication of results. Only a certain 
proportion of findings are used without being tested by a significant method. Therefore, the problem is, ‘by its 
very nature,’ small. Certain mechanisms, such as replication failure, have an influence only on untested results 
that are miniscule in proportion to the amount of tested results. But, in practice, small errors grow really big. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 demonstrates a typical path formation in scholarly life. In this scenario, first generation models 
include influential articles whose findings, by virtue of innovative research programs, are (re-)formulated in 
original ways. After the first generation models, findings are popularized and spread in the market. Second 
generation models often take the forms of textbooks and secondary or follow-up research, the findings of 
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which are primarily borrowed from first generation models. Second generation models are so influential that 
they frequently cite first generation models as well as each other, as a result, their citation figures increase 
logarithmically. Their results are thus established in the market. The findings of the first generation models 
are not often replicated because of high opportunity costs of allowing time for re-testing the findings of 
others. Reputation and power also affect the selection process of researchers where scholars utilize the works 
of reputable authors to legitimize their own findings (Sterman and Wittenberg 1999, Busch and Muthoo 
2003). For instance, research conducted by Nobel laureates and powerful institutions with which Nobel 
laureates are affiliated (such as Rand Corporation, see Mirowski 2002: 153-231) are highly credited and 
further research is often directed by the outcomes of such authors’ work. During all of this, access to financial 
resources and possibilities of finding research partners play prominent roles (Dasgupta and David 1994, David 
and Keely 2002, Fallis 2006). This intermediary phase is thus (i) economically constructed so that growing 
popularity of the first and second generation models operates under increasing returns, (ii) the search for 
research funds is highly influential on the way further research (and its methodology) is conducted, and (iii) 
opportunity costs (i.e. epistemic costs) determine whether to replicate the findings of the original research 
program. 
Replication failure operates in the following way: While a theory or research program spreads among 
scholars due to its intellectual merit, there is also an economic side to the progress of every research program. 
This economic side has to do with the costs arising out of the time that must be allowed to replicate the results 
in the scope of other scholarly works. Economic development of a theory examines the dynamic relations 
among scholars as well as their products (i.e. publications, conference meetings etc.) that positively feed back 
upon each other in mutual support with further evidence and further argumentation. The qualitative resonance 
among scholars is unique: a little achievement or a little error in scholarly theorizing may spread fast and 
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broad. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the ‘Coase Theorem’ as a phenomenon of intellectual path dependence in the 
field of the history of economic ideas. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The case shows that the ‘Coase Theorem’ is reproduced, but the main findings of the economist Coase have 
only been recently replicated. The ‘market for ideas’ had failed for a long time as Stigler’s followers did not 
go to the trouble of looking up Coase himself. They contented themselves with the main findings of Stigler.  
Conclusion 
Some ideas in history exist in such institutionalized environments that we cannot easily eliminate the 
consequences of epistemic failures. The course of events in scholarly life often feeds itself endlessly in such a 
way that early events in the course generate intellectual pathways that last into the future. Such pathways 
sometimes generate positive results, and sometimes negative ones. What is certain is the following: Had such 
ideas not been invented or argued for initially, the entire history of ideas would have been completely 
different. The case of the ‘Coase Theorem’ is an example of the development of intellectual path dependence 
in the history of economic ideas in which a unique event – i.e., Stigler’s interpretation of the writings of Coase 
– generated an unusual pathway in the evolution of economic thought – a pathway in which the message of 
the idea was dissimilar to Coase’s argument in the 1960s, and onwards. Stigler’s ‘Coase Theorem’ was not in 
Coase’s ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937). Neither was it in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960). A chance 
element, namely the element of Stigler in the making of the history of economic ideas, influenced the way his 
contribution is construed by economists today. 
Consequences of such events in similar courses of history can even result in ‘fraud.’ ‘Fraud in this 
context,’ writes Wible, ‘is the deliberate violation of scientific principle for personal material gain and 
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professional advancement’ (Wible 1998: 44). Whether the ‘Coase Theorem’ can be called a ‘fraud’ in the 
above sense is a different matter. What is certain in this case, however, is that a small event – Stigler’s 
interpretation of Coase’s contribution – was an error that lasted until today without being corrected fully and 
has generated an intellectual pathology in history. The problem of the social cost of Stigler’s 
misunderstanding of Coase’s writings to the community of intellectuals has been the failure of markets to 
correct an error that has lasted for decades.  
Endnotes 
[1] See also Stigler 1985: 75-80. 
[2] For a survey of Coase’s contribution to economic analysis see Zerbe 1980, Medema 1994, and 
Mercuro and Medema 2006. 
[3] See also Buttler and Garnett 2003 for another survey in which the authors reported that of 45 
economics textbooks 80 percent misrepresented Coase’s main argument. 
[4] For a collection of major articles on the ‘Coase Theorem’ see Volume II of Medema 1995. 
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Appendix A: Some Top Ranking Articles in Economics
The table ranks some of the most cited articles in (evolutionary) economics which has 
become as popular as Coase (1960). The table suggests that Coase’s 1960 article has 
been one of the most, if not the most, cited in economics. Appendix B supports the 
finding. It shows that Coase’s most cited article is his 1960 article. Coase (1937) should 
be equally important to Coase (1960). However, no data is available about Coase (1937) 
on the ISI database in which only articles published after the 1940s are calculated. 
Nevertheless, the available data imply that Coase has been influential in evolutionary 
economics and his 1960 article should be a special focal point into which historians 
should inquire.
SOURCE : Scientific - Thomson Reuters © ISI Web of Knowledge 
http://www.isiknowledge.com [Accessed in March 2010]
TITLE
YEAR OF 
PUBLICATION
NUMBER OF 
CITATIONS
1 THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST 1960 2964
2 DURABILITY AND MONOPOLY 1972b 314
3 THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 1959 239
4 LIGHTHOUSE IN ECONOMICS 1974b 168
5 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION 1992b 154
6 MARKET FOR GOODS AND MARKET FOR IDEAS 1974c 61
7 THE COASE THEOREM AND THE EMPTY CORE - A COMMENT 1981 34
8 THE ACQUISATION OF FISHER BODY BY GENERAL MOTORS 2000 31
9 THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1998b 30
10 SMITH,A VIEW OF MAN 1976 29
11 THE 1987 MCCORKLE LECTURE - BLACKMAIL 1988a 29
12 ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH 1977a 29
13 THEORY OF PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING AND ITS APPLICATION 1970 28
14 PAYOLA IN RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING 1979 19
15 ECONOMICS AND CONTIGUOUS DISCIPLINES 1978 19
16 LAW AND ECONOMICS AT CHICAGO 1993a 17
17 LAW AND ECONOMICS AND A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON 1996 15
18 CHOICE OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK - COMMENT 1974a 14
19 ECONOMICS OF BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 1966 13
20 ACCOUNTING AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 1990 9
21 COASE ON POSNER ON COASE 1983 8
22 EVALUATION OF PUBLIC-POLICY RELATING TO RADIO & TV 1965 7
23 THE INTERDEPARTMENT RADIO ADVISORY-COMMITTEE 1962 7
24 APPOINTMENT OF PIGOU AS MARSHALLS SUCCESSOR 1972a 6
25 THE CONDUCT OF ECONOMICS 2006 6
26 COMMENT ON THOMAS W. HAZLETT 1998a 5
27 MARSHALL ON METHOD 1975 5
28 THE BRITISH POST-OFFICE AND THE MESSENGER COMPANIES 1961 5
29 MARSHALL,ALFRED MOTHER AND FATHER 1984 3
30 THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES - DISCUSSION 1964 3
31 SYMPOSIUM ON THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1993b 2
32 CONTRACTS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF FIRMS 1991 2
33 WEALTH OF NATIONS 1977b 2
TOTAL 4277
* The table does not include all the publications of Coase but only those which have been cited at least once.
Appendix B: Total Number of Citations of the Works of Ronald 
Coase
* No data is available on Coase's 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) as ISI Web of Knowledge reports publications after 1940s only.
SOURCE: Scientific - Thomson Reuters © ISI Web of Knowledge http://www.isiknowledge.com [Accessed in February 2010]
PUBLICATION YEAR RECORD COUNT
1 1966 5
2 1967 2
3 1968 2
4 1969 8
5 1970 6
6 1971 19
7 1972 27
8 1973 31
9 1974 27
10 1975 28
11 1976 33
12 1977 23
13 1978 27
14 1979 35
15 1980 38
16 1981 31
17 1982 39
18 1983 48
19 1984 27
20 1985 29
21 1986 35
22 1987 29
23 1988 35
24 1989 45
25 1990 49
26 1991 71
27 1992 88
28 1993 103
29 1994 119
30 1995 107
31 1996 123
32 1997 110
33 1998 126
34 1999 106
35 2000 104
36 2001 106
37 2002 117
38 2003 131
39 2004 103
40 2005 108
41 2006 100
42 2007 130
43 2008 102
Appendix C: Development of the Citation Figures of Coase (1960) 'The Problem of Social Cost'
SOURCE: Scientific - Thomson Reuters © ISI Web of Knowledge http://www.isiknowledge.com [Accessed in November 2008]
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CITATION FIGURES OF COASE (1960) 'THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST' 
OVER YEARS
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PUBLICATION NUMBER OF CITATIONS COASE STIGLER The 'Coase Theorem' The Coase Theorem Proper
1 KAHNEMAN, KNETSCH AND THALER (1990) 623 0 • • 0
2 JOLLS, SUNSTEIN, AND THALER (1998) 326 • • • 0
3 HOFFMAN, MCCABE, SHACHAT, AND SMITH (1994) 270 0 0 N/A N/A
4 ELHAUGE (1991) 203 • • • 0
5 HOFFMAN AND SPITZER (1982) 131 • • • 0
6 KAPLOW AND SHAVELL (1996) 131 • 0 • 0
7 KELMAN (1979) 95 • • • 0
8 KOROBKIN (1998b) 90 • 0 • 0
9 KRIER AND SCHWAB (1995) 77 • 0 • 0
10 LEMLEY (1995) 69 • 0 • 0
TOTAL 2015 8 5 9 0
PUBLICATION NUMBER OF CITATIONS COASE STIGLER The 'Coase Theorem' The Coase Theorem Proper
1 JOLLS, SUNSTEIN, THALER (1998) 326 • • • 0
2 HOFFMAN, MCCABE, SHACHAT, AND SMITH (1994) 270 0 0 N/A N/A
3 ELHAUGE (1991) 203 • • • 0
4 KAPLOW AND SHAVELL (1996) 131 • 0 • 0
5 KOROBKIN (1998b) 90 • 0 • 0
6 KRIER AND SCHWAB (1995) 74 • 0 • 0
7 LEMLEY (1995) 69 • 0 • 0
8 GROSS (2003) 64 0 0 N/A N/A
9 KOROBKIN (1998a) 51 • 0 • 0
10 HOVENKAMP (1991) 49 0 • N/A N/A
TOTAL 1327 7 3 7 0
PUBLICATION NUMBER OF CITATIONS COASE STIGLER The 'Coase Theorem' The Coase Theorem Proper
1 NUTTER (1968) 18 • • • 0
2 MUMEY (1971) 17 • • • 0
3 GIFFORD AND STONE (1973) 14 • 0 • 0
4 DARGE (1973) 4 • 0 • 0
5 BUCHANAN (1973) 22 • 0 • 0
6 INADA AND KUGAK (1973) 8 • 0 • 0
7 FRECH (1973) 7 • 0 • 0
8 GIFFORD (1974) 1 • 0 • 0
9 SAMUELS (1974) 27 • 0 • 0
10 SHAPIRO (1974) 8 0 0 • 0
TOTAL 126 9 2 10 0
PUBLICATION NUMBER OF CITATIONS COASE STIGLER The 'Coase Theorem' The Coase Theorem Proper
1 MACHADO (2008) 0 • 0 • 0
2 LAI AND HUNG (2008) 0 • • • 0
3 ROBSON (2008) 0 • • 0 •
4 WHITMAN (2008) 0 • 0 0 •
5 PITCHFORD AND SNYDER (2007) 0 • • 0 •
6 HALPIN (2007) 0 • • 0 •
7 ROSENKRANZ AND SCHMIT (2007) 0 • 0 • 0
8 CHARNESS et al.  (2007) 0 • 0 • 0
9 COHEN AND SANTHAKUMAR (2007) 0 • 0 • 0
10 LEE AND SABOURINA (2007) 0 • 0 • 0
TOTAL 0 10 4 6 4
TOTAL (GENERAL) 3468 34 14 32 4
Figure 1: Survey Summary, the 'Coase Theorem' and the Coase Theorem Proper
(B): MOST CITED 10 ARTICLES ON THE 'COASE THEOREM' AFTER 1991 
(D): MOST RECENT 10 ARTICLES ON THE 'COASE THEOREM' 
(C): FIRST 10 ARTICLES ON THE 'COASE THEOREM' 
* Works considered for column 'Stigler': Stigler (1966, 1971, 1974, and 1975)
(A): MOST CITED 10 ARTICLES ON THE 'COASE THEOREM'
* Works considered for column 'Coase': Coase (1937, 1960, and 1966)
SOURCE: Scientific - Thomson Reuters © ISI Web of Knowledge http://www.isiknowledge.com [Accessed in December 2008, Updated March 2010]
* Only the works that appear in ISI Web of Knowledge are considered
Figure 2: Elements of the formation of intellectual paths in scholarly life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   First generation models Second Generation models : Epistemic costs      INTELLECTUAL PATHS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram, by way of using symbols representing sequential stages and mechanisms between stages in the most simplistic form, depicts a 
typical transmission mechanism in the market for ideas in which decision processes of scholars failing to replicate the findings of past 
generations transform into intellectual paths. Boxes represent different stages in a typical decision process. Arrows with dots (  ) 
correspond to replication failures in the market where second generation models do not test the findings of the first generation models and 
principally rely on (i.e. reproduce) the results of the previous generation. Colum ( : ) signifies the costs generated during the transaction between 
first and second generation models where such costs take the form of epistemic costs. Epistemic costs are the opportunity costs of allowing time 
to replicate the results of the models in previous generations (i.e. models before the tipping point). Such costs disallow intellectuals to re-test past 
results and lock them into particular research programs in the long run. Bold arrows between stages () show the direction of the working 
mechanism. Tipping point is where a small event (such as a replication error) enters the intermediary stage. Lock-in is the final stage of the 
process in which consequences of small events (such replication errors) grow big by way of feedback mechanisms and evolve into intellectual 
pathologies in scholarly life. The diagram indicates that inputs in such systems, via certain mechanisms, transform into a particular result – 
intellectual paths. 
Replication failure 
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FIGURE 3: Elements of the formation of the ‘Coase Theorem’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COASE (1960)     Stigler (1966)             :  Epistemic costs      THE ‘COASE THEOREM’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram, by way of using symbols representing sequential stages and mechanisms between stages in the most simplistic form, depicts the 
transmission mechanism in the ‘market for economic ideas’ in which scholarly processes of decision-giving authors after Stigler’s 1966 article 
transform into an intellectual pathology. Boxes represent different stages in this unique process. Arrows with dots (  ) correspond to 
replication failure in which second generation models (Kahneman, Knetch, and Thales (1990), Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) etc.) do not test 
the findings of the first generation model (Stigler 1966) and principally rely on (i.e. reproduce) available results in the market. Colum ( : ) 
signifies the costs generated during the transaction between second generation models and Stigler (1966). In the case of the ‘Coase Theorem,’ 
epistemic costs are the opportunity costs of allowing time to replicate the results of Coase (1960). Such costs disallow intellectuals to re-test the 
result of Stigler (1966) and lock them into a particular research program – the ‘Coase Theorem.’ Bold arrows between stages () show the 
direction of the working mechanism. Tipping point is where the erroneous interpretation of Stigler was published in 1966. Lock-in is the stage in 
which the ‘Coase Theorem’ is accepted as the established message of Coase (1960). The diagram indicates that inputs in the ‘market of economic 
ideas’ such as errors in interpretation, via the mechanism of replication failure, lead to a particular result – such as the ‘Coase Theorem.’ 
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